This is the final paper that I wrote for my class, Comparative Politics of the Middle East. I took this class fall of my senior year. In the class, we focused each week on a different country in the Middle East, and learned about its politics and prospects of democracy. The final paper was introduced very early in the course and could be related to democracy in any of the countries that we had talked about. Although the Turkey unit was later in class, I knew that I wanted to look at the erosion of democracy in Turkey. For this paper, I tried to look at democratic backsliding from more of a cultural standpoint. Turkey is unique because it is historically similar to other countries in the MENA, however, in more recent years it has been politically included in Europe. This creates tensions within Turkey where the culture does not quite match what political advances politicians believe need to be made in order to assimilate in to Europe. In a lot of literature around backsliding democracy, the culture aspect is often overlooked in order to pin instances of eroding democracy into theories that can be categorised. Although this paper does talk about theory, I tried to use the skills I learned in GEM to put more emphasis into understanding the perspective of the people in the country.
Why Has Erdoğan Been Able to Cling onto Power in Turkey?
- INTRODUCTION
The fall of Western democracies in the past few decades has become a rising area of study in comparative politics. Until the early 2000s, Western societies were believed to have achieved moderate political parties who would govern with a commitment to liberal democracy, open economics, and multilateral cooperation (Norris 2017, p. 2). This ideal seemed to be taking root across the globe. However, more recently, some of these democracies, like many that emerged during the Arab uprisings, have not supported the core values associated with liberal democracy (Norris 2017, p. 2). Looking more closely at the Middle East, Turkey in particular, is an interesting case, because it debunks the theory that wealthy nations are more likely to have their democracy survive (Bayulgen et. al. 2018, p. 337). Since 2010, Turkey’s democracy has been on the decline according to V-dem, a database that maps out levels of democracy around the world. Prior to 2010, democracy had been on the rise but in 2014, it fully reverted from democratic rule (Haggard and Kaufman 2021, p. 195). Turkey’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, was first elected prime minister in 2002 and democratically elected to the presidency in 2014. Since then, he has been able to consolidate his presidential power, overriding systems of checks and balances by capturing the media, taking control over the judiciary, and changing the constitution (Haggard and Kaufman 2021, p. 204). Now, Turkey has been called by some scholars like Esen and Gumuscu (2025) a “competitive authoritarian regime,” leaving experts wondering how this could have happened to a country that had once seemed to be aligned with Western values.
This paper will explore the question of why Erdoğan has been able to cling onto power in Turkey. It will look at a variety of explanations from scholars such as polarisation, personalism, and the broader context of Turkey’s cultural history and current geopolitical position in the world. I will highlight the intersections between these arguments and show where they fall flat. This paper concludes by identifying a gap in these literatures around the cultural and historical conditions that has led polarisation and personalism to take footing in the country. Understanding these elements is essential to get the full picture as to why Erdoğan has been able to maintain power in a country once headed for liberal democracy.
- MAIN BODY
Polarisation
Democratic backsliding in Turkey over the past decade has been observed by the rising power of the executive branch and the erosion of institutional checks and balances, which has been largely connected to Erdoğan’s strategic use of populism and polarisation (Haggard and Kaufman 2021, p. 206). Loyalist judicial appointments and increased control over the media by the imprisonment of opposition reporting journalists has tilted the political spectrum in favor of Erdoğan and his party, the AKP (Haggard and Kaufman 2021, p. 205).
In observance of these events, many scholars point to polarisation as to why Erdoğan has stayed in power. Erdoğan has put out polarising messages, separating the secularists from the conservative, religious nationalists (Haggard and Kaufman 2021, p. 197). Through his populist rhetoric, he was able to gain the support of the general population (the “us”) against the elites (the “them”) (197). From there, his party, the AKP, has been able to rage an assault against institutional structures, weakening the independence of the judiciary and taking over parliament and the media all while sustaining populist support (204, 205).
There is quantitative evidence to back the polarisation theory up. Elçi (2019) also points to polarisation and populism. Using quantitative analysis, he looks at parliamentary speeches and finds that Erdoğan is significantly more populist than other leaders. He found that after events like the Gezi protest, where a protest over an urban development plan spiraled into a protest of freedom of press, assembly, and women and LGBTQ+ rights, and the July 15, 2016 coup attempt against Erdoğan, increased populist discourse (Elçi 2019, p. 388 and Haggard and Kaufman 2021, p. 198). Erdoğan portrays himself as against elites and for the people. His political endeavors are centered around conservatism, and he is supported by the conservative, religious, working class majority against the corrupt, secular elites, Western powers, and internal enemies (Elçi 2019, p. 391).
Haggard and Kaufman (2021) and Elçi (2019) all show that polarisation is not just a natural outcome of political competition, but a deliberate strategy by Erdoğan to strengthen himself and the AKP. While they explain that populism is an authoritarian strategy, they do not address why these elites have remained in power these past twenty years. Bayulgen et. al. (2018) take the theory of polarisation further in their analysis, arguing that not only did polarisation divide the country and erode democratic structures, but it actually worked to empower the elites the common people were supposed to be united against.
Bayulgen et. al. (2018) look at Turkey as a hybrid regime. They argue that the weakening of democratic elements is a byproduct of the polarisation that is used to help elites stay in power (335). By splintering opposition and relying heavily on ideological and polarising rhetoric, Erdoğan and his party can divert challenges to elite rule away from themselves (333). This shows that polarisation is an exceedingly manipulative political strategy. Although the 2016 coup attempt in Istanbul against Erdoğan was meant to bring down the elites, that did not happen. In fact, the incumbents further entrenched their executive power (334) and it resulted in Erdoğan declaring a state of emergency and those who participated in the movement were charged with terrorism (Bayulgen et. al., p. 337 and Haggard and Kaufman 2021, p. 202). Those who conspire against him are broadcasted to be associated with the corrupt, secular elites, Western powers, and internal enemies that Erdoğan frames himself against (Elçi 2019, p. 391).
Personalism
While polarisation explains a lot about Erdoğan’s maintenance of power, it does not address why Erdoğan’s personal popularity has sustained, but in recent years support for the AKP has gone down. This gap has led some scholars to instead look at Erdoğan as a leader beyond political affiliation. Esen and Gumuscu (2025) use the most recent election against İmamoğlu as a case study. Erdoğan’s party is still facing problems as only he is receiving enthusiastic support. His party has failed to win an outright majority and are losing support in their (still mostly clean) elections (117). The AKP’s declining performance suggests that polarisation can not be the sole attribution for Erdoğan’s political survival.
Instead, Esen and Gumuscu (2025) highlight his personalistic rule and the erosion of democratic structures that surround the presidential branch. The judiciary’s prosecution of İmamoğlu (109) was followed by negative media portrayals of İmamoğlu from Erdoğan supporting media outlets (110). This shows that Erdoğan relies on not just his party or the institutions he has consolidated, but the media portrayals that have been bent towards his favor (112). This shift shows that appeal to his character is a large part in Erdoğan’s maintenance of power.
There is empirical support for Turkey’s evolution from a regime dominated by one party to a regime dominated by one personalistic leader. Öztürk and Reilly (2024) state that the AKP’s internal power and institutional autonomy has eroded since 2016 (167), which has produced a regime where the president has centralised power into himself alone (176) even though it appears that the party dominates all the elections (175). The authors highlight how a lot of who surrounds Erdoğan in power is not based on party affiliation, but rather familial ties and loyalty, which is a defining characteristic of personalistic regimes (177).
Erdoğan’s personalism helps explain his resilient power despite declining party support, but it does not quite address why his personal loyalty is so high. Yes, structures have been eroded, but as Esen and Gumuscu (2025) point out, elections are still mostly clean (117). What, therefore, contributes to his support?
Geopolitical and Cultural Context
Other scholars look beyond Erdoğan’s regime and to confounding factors like Western powers and Turkish history. Coskun and Dueck (2025) focus on the efforts by the EU to stop the wave of autocratisation across the globe and find that in Turkey, efforts for democratisation are undermined by internal developments. Turkey was democratizing but erosion to rule of law and a shrinking space for Civil Society Organisations (CSO’s) threatened EU and CSO cooperation to promote democracy (1685). Erdoğan has been able to stop pro-democracy efforts that would have helped Turkey continue their democratisation process by using autocratic strategies of delegitimisation and criminalisation (1696). While there is some explanation to be found in looking at the collapse of Western efforts to democratise Turkey, the Western centralised argument fails to address the broader history of Turkey. Karaveli (2016) points to Turkish history. Turkey has had a conservative, illiberal history. At the time of Erdoğan’s election, pro-right groups were on the rise (126). He argues that Westerners and Western scholars seem to forget this about Turkey and overportray Erdoğan’s initial victory as a win for capitalism over authoritarianism when Turkey was not going that way in the first place (127).
Both the Western argument and the historical argument have truth to them that should not be discounted. Turkey’s place in the world stage and in the Western world has been on the rise, especially given its proximity to Europe. There have been debates over Turkey’s “Europeaness.” Europeaness in Turkey has been determined by political standards, not geographical, historical, or cultural (Lippert 2021, p. 271). Internally, Turkey is culturally and demographically more similar to countries in the Middle East, which presented itself as a problem during the US war in Iraq. Turkey’s alliance with the European Union became more strained during this time, even though they maintained their strategic importance (Lippert 2021, p. 273). The early 2000s in Turkey is a time of this internal strain with Turkey’s historical roots. It is also a time of external strain as its relationship with Western democracies becomes more and more strategic rather than like an alliance. It is also at this time that Turkey’s democracy began to backslide (273).
Understanding Turkey’s backsliding and the origins of polarisation requires looking at both internal and external factors. These factors should not be framed as a one or the other explanation, but rather be looked at alongside each other.
- CONCLUSION
This paper has explored why Erdoğan has maintained power in Turkey, a country that once seemed to be on a democratic upturn. Across the many readings, a few thematic explanations have emerged: polarisation, populism, and historical and geographical context.
A lot of the literature looks at polarisation. Erdoğan has used a strategy of framing political issues as a contest between the conservative, religious majority against the secular, Western-oriented elites. Because of polarisation, the AKP has been able to consolidate power, fragment opposition, and justify the erosion of institutions within the government. Quantitative work shows that populism has increased after political movements such as the Gezi protests and the coup attempt. Other scholars have expanded on this argument and show that polarisation ultimately helps the elites stay in power despite people being unified against them. What none of these polarisation arguments address is what historical backdrop in Turkey led to the rise in polarisation in the first place.
Scholars who look at personalistic rule offer another perspective on this issue. Although there has been democratic backsliding that has concentrated power in the executive, Erdoğan continues to receive genuine popular support from the people. This means that his political prevalence can not be only attributed to institutional erosion, there is also a large base of people who see him as a suitable candidate. Why, after reverting so much of Turkey’s democratic efforts, would people want to continue to see him in power?
What the scholars focused on polarisation and personalistic rule fail to address is the significance of the historical context around the emergence of polarisation and his personalistic rule. Why was polarisation able to emerge so quickly and powerfully? What, exactly, did a majority of Turkish society despise about the secular elites? External and historical factors help complete this picture. The efforts by the EU to democratise Turkey weakened as Erdoğan delegitimised CSOs. At the same time, the longer history of Turkey’s conservative, illiberal politics began to bleed again, which has created the democratic backsliding many Westerners observe. Scholars who look at the West look too much into Western standards of how a democracy should look like and scholars who look at historical factors in Turkey do not connect Erdoğan’s consolidation of power to being a strong backlash against Western influences, framing it as a mere continuation of authoritarianism instead of structured, political hatred.
Throughout these debates, there is a gap in research that emerges. Most literature looks at polarisation as an outcome, but pays little attention to why polarisation, specifically resentment against the secular elite, has resonated so sincerely with the majority of voters in the first place. There are few scholars who directly address what was so alienating about the secular elite, or how Turkey’s political position between being in the “West” but having a cultural identity that is more similar to the Middle East has influenced the voters’ reactions to political change. Understanding the contradictions between the international relations of Turkey and the culture of Turkey will help explain Erdoğan’s long reigning regime, polarisation, and the continued loyalty he has received throughout it all.
Polarisation, personalism, and historical and international context all help explain the same picture, but literature has yet to fully connect these arguments. By identifying and exploring this gap, we can get a better understanding of the ingredients that has allowed Erdoğan to thrive in over twenty years of power in a country that once seemed to be heading toward a liberal democracy.
- WORKS CITED
Bayulgen, Oksan, Ekim Arbatli, and Sercan Canbolat. 2018. “Elite Survival Strategies and Authoritarian Reversal in Turkey.” Polity 50 (3): 387–411.
Coskun, Murat, and Elena Dueck. 2025. “Downward Spirals in EU Democracy Promotion: How Contestations and Shrinking Spaces for Civil Society Organizations Limit the EU’s Influence in Turkey.” Democratization 32 (7): 1684–1707. https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2025.2514767
Elçi, Ezgi. 2019. “The Rise of Populism in Turkey: A Content Analysis.” Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 19 (3): 387–408. https://doi.org/10.1080/14683857.2019.1656875
Esen, Berk, and Sebnem Gumuscu. 2025. “How to Fight Turkey’s Authoritarian Turn.” Journal of Democracy 36 (3): 106–120.
Haggard, Stephan, and Robert Kaufman. 2021. “Appendix: Turkey.” In Backsliding: Democratic Regress in the Contemporary World, 196–212. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Karaveli, Halil. 2016. “Erdogan’s Journey: Conservatism and Authoritarianism in Turkey.” Foreign Affairs 95 (6): 121–130. http://www.jstor.org/stable/43948388
Lippert, Barbara. 2021. “Turkey as a Special and (Almost) Dead Case of EU Enlargement Policy.” In EU-Turkey Relations: Theories, Institutions, and Policies, 267–293. Cham: Springer International Publishing.
Norris, Pippa. 2017. “Is Western Democracy Backsliding? Diagnosing the Risks.” The Journal of Democracy, HKS No. RWP17-012. SSRN. https://ssrn.com/abstract=2933655
Öztürk, Sevinç, and Thomas Reilly. 2024. “Assessing Centralization: On Turkey’s Rising Personalist Regime.” Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 24 (1): 167–185. https://doi.org/10.1080/14683857.2022.2137899
- AI STATEMENT
I used AI to assist me with the two page reflection in the previous assignment, which was cited there at the time, and I have not used it since. All writing in this paper is my own.
